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SUMMARY
In this essay we explore the implications of human capital and search
behavior for both the interpersonal and life—cycle structure of inter—firm
labor mobility. The economic hypothesis which motivates the analysis is that
individual differences in firm—specific complementarities and related skill
acquisitions produce differences in mobility behavior and in the relation
between job tenure, wages and mobility. Both "job duration dependencet' and'
heterogeneity bias" are implied by this theory. Exploration of longitudinal
data sets (NLS and MID) which contain mobility, job and wage histories of men
in the 1966—76 decade yield the following findings, among others:
1. The initially steep and later decelerating declines of labor mobility
with working age are in large part due to the similar but more steeply declin-
ing relation between mobility and length of job tenure.
2. Given tenure levels, the probability of moving is predicted positively
by the frequency of prio moves and negatively by education. The inclusion of
prior moves in the regression reduces the estimated tenure slope because it
helps to remove the "heterogeneity bias" in that slope.
3. The popular "mover—stayer model" is rejected by the existence of
tenure effects on mobility.
4. Differences in mobility during the first decade of working life do not
predict long—run differences in earnings. However, persistent movers at later
stages of working life have lower wage levels and flatter life—cycle wage growth.
5. The analysis calls for a reformulation of earnings (wage) functions.
Inclusion of tenure terms in the function permits separate estimates of returns
to general and specific human capital after correction for heterogeneity bias.
A rough estimate is that 50 percent of life—time wage growth is due to general






New York, N.Y. 10027
(212) 280—3676PART I
Labor Mobility and Wage!t
1. Introduction: Renewed Interest in Labor Mobility
Labor mobility is one of the central topics of labor economics and
a long—standing subject of empirical research. Earlier studies reflected
primarily a concern with the allocative efficiency of the labor market.
They analyzed attitudes, job—change decisions and the direction of ob-
served labor mobility in attempts to ascertain whether information,
motivation and behavior of workers were consistent with the postulates
of economic theory.
ifl a comprehensive survey of this literature (Parnes, 1970) the
author concluded that the evidence on the operation of market forces
was mixed, both among different studies and even within them. Although
research in the 1960's was more sophisticated and utilized larger data
sets than prior work it did not provide any change in perspective.
Reviewing the more recent literature Parsons (1976) finds promise
in the emergence of human capital and of search theories as tools for
the analysis of labor mobility, labor turnover, and unemployment.
However, applied work in search theoryhas,thus far, only partially
touched on problems of labor mobility and of unemp1oyinent Its emphasis
has been largely on conditions terminating job search, rather than on
circumstances which generate it.
The reformulation of labor mobility as a human capital investment
decision has been fruitfully applied to migration (Sjastaad, 1962, and
other work reviewed by Greenwood, 1976). The connection between invest-
mentsspecific to the firm. (andto larger units) and the incidence of
*partI is an exposition and empirical analysis whch ranges over some-
what wider subject matter than Part II which focuses on the stochastic
structureof mobility processes. We are grateful to the National Science
Foundation and the Sloan Foundation for support of this work
The research reported here is part of the NBER's program in Labor
Economics. Any opinions expressed are those of the authors and not those
of the National Bureau of Economic Research.industrial and occupational labor turnover has been elucidated in studies
of Becker (1962) ,Oi(1961) ,andParsons (1972)
The novel approaches suggested by human capital and by search
theories are producing a renewed interest in the formerly stagnant field
of labor mobility. A further source of interest has come from stochastic
models of labor mobility. These made their initial appearance as the
"mover-stayer" model two decades ago (Blumen, Kagan, McCarthy, 1955) and
have recently reappeared in more sophisticated form.1
The purpose of this essay2 is to explore the implications of human
capital and search behavior for both the interpersonal and life cycle
structure of inter-firm labor mobility. The apparent ambiguity in the
relation between labor mobility and wages which characterizes much of
the literature surveyed by Parnes is implicit and reconcilable in human
capital analysis: As a response to perceived gains in wages mobility
promotes individual wage growth, but to the extent that on-the-job invest-
ments contain elements of specificity, mobility is a deterrent to wage
growth. The study of differences in mobility behavior requires inform-
ation over time: Of special importance, in our approach, is information
on time spent in the firm (tenure) and on the life—cycle changes in job
attachments. The availability of longitudinal inicrodata (especially
NLSandMID panels) enables us to study these phenomena.
The economic hypothesis which motivates the analysis is that indiv-
idual differences in firm—specific human capital behavior lead, via wage
effects, to heterogeneity in mobility behavior, and to "tenure effects"
on attachment to the firm. Implications for life—cycle mobility are
then derived in the absence or presence of "aging" (changes in mobility
with age, at given tenure levels). Both "tenure dependence" and "hetero——3—
geneitybias" are implied by the theory. We explore data sets which
contain mobility histories to ascertain the existence of these phenomena
and to correct for the predictable biases. Next we investigate corres-
ponding features of the wage structure. Labor mobility and tenure effects
are introduced and tested in a reformulated earnings function in which
specificand general human capital accumulation can be distinguished.
Part II presents a rigorous formulation of the structure of mobility
viewedas a stochastic process.
2. Tenure, Working Age, and Mobility: Some Definitions and Facts
We define labor mobility as change of employer, whether or not
unemployment intervenes. We exclude exits from and entries into the labor
force. This exclusion is a minor one for the male labor force which we
study.3Consequently,job separation is synonymous with job change in
our data. Except for one illustration of observed differences (in Table
2), we do not distinguish here between separations initiated by (or
reported as) quit or layoff. Geographic, industrial, and occupational
mobility are components of job mobility which are included in our concept
but not singled out for separate treatnient.4
Two probabilistic relations, or time—profiles, are basic in our
discussion and measurement of labor mobility.(1) The "tenure turnover
profile" S(T) is the relation between the probability of separating
from a job in period t and the time spent in that job prior to t (current
tenure T). In the language of renewal theory, S(T) is the "hazard
function". At the individual level this is a profile of "propensities
to move" conditional on tenure. Such a profile is not observable. In
large homogeneous groups, that is consisting of individuals with thesame propensitiesS(T), we can observe estimates oftheprobabilities in
eachperiod in the form of relative frequencies or separation rates
conditional on tenure.(2) The relation between an individualts
propensity to move and working age, regardless of his current tenure,
is his "experience turnover profile" S(X).Again this is observable
asa relation between experience and separation rates.
The most firmly establishedfact about labor mobility of all kinds
isthat it declines with age. It declinesmuch more sharply with length
oftenure. The declines inboth S(X) and S(T) are strongest initially
anddecelerate subsequently. Several tenure and age profiles of separ-
ation rates are shown in Tables 1—3.
Table 1 shows the decline with age in the proportion of job changers
(number of job changers divided by number employed) in 1961. The decline
is similar when measured in terms of number of job changes rather than
job changers, since a similar fraction (35—40 percent) of job movers ih
each age group changed jobs more than once during the year.5
Table 2 shows cross—classifications of separations, quits and lay-
offs by experience and tenure in the period 1971-73 in the two NLS
samples of men (young men, ages 19—29 and older men ages 50—64 in 1971).
The tenure profiles within working age (experience) classes are steeply
declining and decelerating (convex). Mobility does not decline with age
at given tenure levels within each of the cohort age ranges. The
decline between the young and old cohort is pronounced but it shows
mainly in quits.
The separation equations in Table 3 summarize the nc1usion that
within the two age panels declines of mobility with age (experience),
shown by S(X) in Tables 1 and 2, are due to the effect of tenure which is.BLE 3.


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































S(X) —.486—.034x+ .002x2 R2 — .02
(5.2) (3.6)
S(X,T) •.692+.006X—.0000X2—.172T+ .009T2 R2 —.29
(1.0) (0) (i9.7)(6.3)
Older Men, Pooled
S(X) —.015+ .0028X—.000X2 R2 —.003
(.4)
S(X,T) —.208+ .0035X —.0000X2—.024T+.0005T2 R2 —.10
(.3) (.2) (6.4) (4.1)
Source: NLSSamples ofYoung andMature Men.revealed in the regression S(X,T): For young men, experience effects
(coefficients of X, X2) vanish when tenure (T, T2) is included. No
experience effects are observed for older men with or without the tenure
variables.6 However, estimates of S(X) and S(X,T) in Michigan Income
Dynamics data which cover the complete age spectrum (Table 5, Panel C,
lines 1 and 2) show that net aging effects remain even after the inclusion
of tenure, although they are reduced in size and significance. In all
data sets the explanatory power resides mainly in the tenure variables;
mobility is convex both in tenure and in experience; and the tenure
profile is much steeper than the experience profile.
3. Wage and Mobility Structures: Some Theory
We now turn to broad theoretical considerations with which we
may analyze the facts of labor mobility. Some aspects of skill ac-
quired in a particular firm are not transferable to other firms.The
acquisition of such "specific" components of human capital by workers
and the consequent wage pattern suffice to produce the tenure effects
in the attachment to the firm which we observed in Tables 2 and 3. At
the same time individual differences in amounts of specific capital
investment imply a heterogeneity in mobility, or in attachment to the
firm (length of tenure) as well as in the strength of tenure effects
that is in slopes of the tenure-separation probability relation.
The effects of acquiring job specific capital on mobility may be
described as follows: Successful job matches eventually result in
wage levels W which exceed expected alternative wages Wg. The higher
the wage W the less incentive to quit, given the usual fluctuations in
demand. Separations are high during the initial "probation" period anddrop to low levels. It is reasonable to assume that a successful match is
only a starting point for a continuing employment relation which often
involves investments of workers and firms in worker skills, and these
are partially nontransferable.7 Employer investments involve hiring,
screening, and training costs which are recouped by wage policy Wg < W
< VMP, where VMP is the workerts value of marginal product in the firm,
sothat both quits and layoffs are deterred.
Define W =
Wg+W51where Wg is the worker return on his general
(transferable) human capital and W is the difference between the
(higher) wage received in the firm and the opportunity wage elsewhere
(Wg)• Similarly, We is the employer's return on the costs of investing
in workers, the difference between the worker's productivity (VMP) and
the wage paid to him (W). Workers are deterred from quitting and
employers from dismissing workers, because of these returns. Total
separations are affected by=(VMP-
Wg)
=
W5+ We that is by both
components of returns to specific capital. In this paper we do not
focus on the distinction between quit and layoff and do not consider
the question whether employers and workers engage in joint or in separate
optimizing behavior.8 Plausibly, W and We are expected to be positively
related: a good match and opportunity for joint investments are recog-
nized by both employee and employer.
The distribution of returns to specific capital ()createsindiv-
idual (and group) differences in tenure—turnover profiles. Tenure pro-
files are horizontal only when =0,in which case tenure has no effect
on mobility or on wages. With > 0, tenure profiles of specific capital
does not emerge instantaneously as the worker joins the firm. It is
accumulated over time, given a successful match, and the returns grow over
time. Both the rate of growth of these returns and their ultimate level
affect mobility:the "tenure effect" is steeper the bigger both. The convexity of the
tenure—mobility profiles, and concavity of the tenure-wage profiles are
due to the eventual completion of specific capital accumulation in the
9
firm.
Thus the economics of specific human capital formation predicts the
coexistence of heterogeneity and of "tenure dependence" in mobility.
The two aspects of behavior are related and re not to be viewed as
mutually exclusive hypotheses: Persons who favor large volumes of
specific capital investment exhibit relatively little mobilityl0 (except
f an initial period of repeated search and occasional later moves) and
strong tenure effects. Low levels of specific investment behavior, whether
intentional or due to inefficiency in job matching, imply high (persistent)
mobility levels independent of tenure (zero or small tenure effects).
If rates of decline of experience profiles of mobility reflect primarily
the slopes of tenure profiles, as appears to be the case, the flat and
high profiles of "movers" and the downward sloping profiles of "stayers"
imply a progressive divergence over the life-cycle in observed mobility
behavior of a heterogeneous population.
The growing divergence of mobility rates over the workingage parallels
the repeatedly observed divergence of individual life—cyclewage profiles.11
The human capital model can interpret both as lifetime outcomes of un-
changing individual differences in abilities and opportunities. This
view cautions against literal impressions that older cohorts are more
heterogeneous than younger ones, or against the notion that the experience
of longer tenure creates a "reinforcement effect" that is a desire to invest
in specific capital. This is not to say, however, that such viewsare notvalid. Habit formation and unexpected contingencies do modify lifetime
histories, but they need not be invoked in an initial analysis.
The major implication of specific capital .heterogeneity for the
structure of mobility is the existence of differential tenure effects.
Levels of S(T) are higher and slopes flatter for individuals and groups
who acquire little specificity in their human capital, while steeper
slopes and eventually lower -levels characterize tenure functions of
large specific capital investors. Empirical observations should reveal
downward slopes in tenure—turnover profiles exaggerated by "hetero-
geneity bias", as well as "true" negative slopes after correction for bias.
A related set of predictions applies to the wage structure: A
major one jS the existence of tenure effects on wages which are additional
to the effects of general human capital accumulation. This suggests a
reformulation of the earnings function to include a tenure term. The
experience and tenure coefficients should provide a decomposition of worker
returns to general (transferable) and specific (nontransferable) human
capital. As in the case of mobility it is also necessary to attempt
correction for potential upward biases in tenure effects which are posed
by the existence of heterogeneity.
Other implications of the theory relate to age (experience) changes
in mobility and wages S(X) and W(X). An interesting conclusion is that
mobility declines and wages grow -withage even if there are no
"aging" effects, that is even if mobility depended only on levels of
tenure and not directly on age (given tenure). Similarly, wages would
grow (on average) over the life-cycle even if no general (experience)
capital were accumulated. Also W(X) would be concave if W(T) is concave,
and S(X) is convex because S(T) is. Indeed, without specific capitalphenomena the convex shape of the age patterns of mobility S(X) would be
difficult to understand.
4. Tenure Effects on Mobility in Homogeneous
and in Heterogeneous Groups
A simple heuristic model makes the notions intuitively clear:12
The propensity to move at the individual level, or the separation rate
in a homogeneous group is a function:
s =f(T,X) (1)
where s is the probability of separation in period t, T is length of
current employment in the firm up to time t, and X is total work exper-




Here is the slope of the tenure profile, is the growth of tenure
with working age, and is the true age effect, if any. Note that
o< < 1. Tenure would grow by the same amount of time as age only dx
in the case of perfect immobility: It increases initially with age since
it is necessarily short at early stages of experience. At later stages
approaches zero as T approaches the fixed value (.— 1)in the ease
of no-tenure depeidence, that is when =0.In the case of job
specificity or tenure dependence, i.e., when .!<0, remainspositive dx
at later ages as well.'3 A regression of T on X, not shown here, reveals
a positive slope and slight concavity.
Decomposition (2) yields the following conclusions about the
observed decline of mobility with age:1. Even if there were no "age effects" (-= 0),mobility would
decline with age, because of job specificities, thatisbecause mobility
declines with tenure < 0. No decline would be observed if mobility
were independent of tenure.
2. Again abstracting from age effects, since d.!< 1, the slope of
dx
the experience profile is less than that of the tenure profile.
3. Convexity in the tenure profile would be reinforced or simply
reflected in the age profile if decreases over time, or is constant.
Moreover, this could happen even if there is an age effect and even if
the latter were concave.
4. Decline of mobility with age is faster the stronger the decline
of mobility with tenure, apart from the pure age effect.
Up to this point the analysis applies to a homogeneous group,
defined by the identical S(X,T) function for each of its members.
Components of life-cycle mobility can be observed directly in such
groups by estimation of equation (1). Generally, it is not possible
to define homogeneous groups empirically, so that estimation of (1)
cannot be carried out directly. If in fact individual propensities to
move are not reduced by tenure yet they differ among workers, the ob-
served group tenure profile S(T) will have a downward slope and is
likely to be convex as well. In this case persons with high propen-
sities to move separate at early levels of tenure while those with
low propensities stay on a long time. The decline in the tenure pro-
file consequently reflects the degree of heterogeneity when measured
by the variance in propensities to move, while convexity would reflect
a decline in that variance, as only stayers remain in the long tenure
classes15— —
Letus now define a heterogeneous population in consonance with
specific capital heterogeneity as a collection of. homogeneous subgroups
among which mobility rates differ at given levels of tenure, while
tenure curves S(T) decline in some or most of the subgroups. By the
preceding argument, any degree of heterogeneity will lend a downward
bias (steeper than average slope) to the observed group tenure curve.
We should note that heterogeneity biases can exist without any true
tenure effects, for reasons not involving specificity. But, if the
tenure effect ()iszero in each subgroup i, the observed population
experience profile S(X) will be horizontal, since its slope is an aver-
age of slopes in the subgroups. Conversely, if <0 in each or some
subgroups the observed experience profile must slope down. Thus, in the
absence of age effects, the age profile of mobility S(X) provides a clear
test of the presence or absence of tenure effects in the group, regard-
less of its degree of heterogeneity.
16 As an example, the popular "mover-stayer"model which assumes
heterogeneity and neglects tenure effects must be rejected by the decline
in the age—mobility profile, insofar as the latter is not exclusively
due to pure age effects (i.<0in (1)).
Although the decline in life—cycle mobility reflects the existence
and strength of tenure effects, it yields no information on the extent of
heterogeneity in the population. Assessment of heterogeneity is important,
however, both in its own right, as well as a basis for recognition and
correction of bias in the estimated tenure effects.5. Empirical Mobility Functions
An open-ended empirical procedure for estimating tenure effects in
the presence of heterogeneity is to enter a number of variables which
are likely to capture heterogeneous behavior in a regression of tenure
on mobility. The tenure slope estimate in the multiple regression is
reduced compared to its value when it is the only right-hand variable.
The reduction measures the extent of heterogeneity bias due to these
variables. This procedure was applied to the NLS data and the results
are shown in Table 4, including the list of heterogeneity factors. The
reduction in slope was about 20-30 percent for the young men, and larger
(relative to the flatter slope) for the older men.
The heterogeneity factors in the regressions were, aside from
experience which was also included: education, health, hours of work,
family status variables, industry, and union membership. In terms of
contribution to the last two factors were the most pronounced.
This procedure is clearly incomplete for our purposes here, although
of interest in the substantive studies of particular facthrs.
A scheme that is more genera], in the sense that it does not require
an enumeration of heterogeneity factors derives from the definition: At
a given level of tenure members of a homogeneous group have equal prob-
abilities of moving during the next period regardless of their past
mobility, while in a heterogeneous group probabilities differ even at
fixed current tenure. Since frequency of past mobility is an indicator
of personal probability ("propensity to move") in the heterogeneous case,
its (partial) correlation with mobility in the next period, given tenure,










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 the extent that the prior mobility variable captures and therefore stand-
ardizes for differential mobility levels its inclusion corrects the bias
in the estimated tenure slope.
-
Informationon prior mobility was available in the NLS data for young
men as the number of interfirm moves (NM) between 1966 and 1971. For t1
older men in NLS such information was not available, but we constructed
a variable (PM) on the number of (survey to survey) periods between 1965
and 1973 during which at least one move took place.1
Table 5 presentsi in successive steps, regressions for young men
(Panel A) in which separations (job changes) in the period 1971-73 are
predicted by: years of work experience (X, X2) up to 1971, tenure (T, T2)
in 1971, and mobility prior to the current job (NM). The prior mobility
variable was also interacted with experience (XNN). The same regressions
(except that PM replaces NM) predict job changerates of NLS older men
in 1973—75 (Panel B), and of all MID men in 1975—76 (Panel C).
Briefly, the findings are: Inclusion of tenure (line 2) shows it
to be the variable which is responsible for the gross age decline in
separations among young NLS men (line 1, Panel A). Looking at lines
1 and 2 of panel B, we find that the older NLS men show neither gross
nor net age (experience) effects. While net age effects are absent
withir the limited age ranges in the NLS data (young29, old ￿50)
they are reduced (going from line 1 to 2 in panel C) but remain signif-
icant in the MID regressions which cover the whole age spectrum. The
absence of gross age effects (line 1, panel B) in the older cohort
reflects very small tenure effects (slopes) at this stage. This is
consistent with a strong convexity of tenure (and age) profiles over
the long run. The comparable tenure slopes are much steeper for the
young because they are dominated in regressions by early tenure levels.Regression Variables in Tables 5 and 6
X -yearsof work experience
T -yearsof tenure on the currentjob
Ed -yearsof schooling
-numberofinterfirm moves in the period 1966—1971 of young men in NLS.
Adjusted to length of period if experience started after 1966.
PM -numberof 2-year periods between 1965 and 1973 during which a job change
occurred among older men in NLS.
SM -numberof annual periods between 1968 and 1975 during which a job change
occurred among men in MID. Adjusted if work experience started
after 1968.
w -logarithmof hourly wage; w —meanofw






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Indeed, in a subsample of older men whose tenure does not exceed 8 years
(not shown here), the tenure slopes are quite as steep as those of young
men. Thus, the differences between the young and the old need not be
interpreted as a change in the mobility structure.
The inclusion of prior mobility variables shows the existence of
heterogeneity in mobility behavior: The variable is a strong predictor
of mobility in the next period given experience and tenure at the
beginning of the period. Persons who moved more frequently prior to
the current job are more likely to leave the job earlier than others.
Prior mobility appears to be a stronger predictor at older than at
younger ages. This can be seen in the effect on R2 (i.e. in the partial
correlation), and in the regression slope. When converted into an
elasticity it is several times larger in the older group. Evidently,
repeated mobility at an advanced age represents persistent mobility
suggesting little stake in job tenure or lack of opportunity, while
repeated mobility at young ages does not have the same connotation.
We tried to test the proposition that prior mobility at older ages is
a better index of heterogeneity within each of the panels: The experience—
prior mobility interaction variable, shown in line 4 of each panel, was
positive and significant. Incidentally, the existence of this
interaction implies that age (experience) profiles of mobility are not
only higher but also flatter for movers (PM large) than for stayers
(PM small), as we theorized in section 3 (p.11).
The introduction of the prior mobility variable was designed to
separate "movers" from "stayers". If effective, such "standardization"
should reduce the tenure slope in the regression. Tenure slopes areindeed reduced in all three data panels in lines 3 and below. The
reduction is small among the young and large among the old, as would be
expected since PM is a stronger indicator of persistent mobility at
older ages. The average reduction in the linear tenure term at mid-
experience levels (MID) is about one—third. That is, heterogeneity
biases the steepness of tenure-turnover profile upward by about 50 percent,
on average. As predicted,'inclusion of prior mobility which is an
attempt to, standardize for heterogeneity, reduces the tenure slope by
about a third (in the linear term) among the young and by close to two-
thirds among the old. Incidentally, the education variable shown in
-
thelast rows of Table 5 appears to predict some reductions in mobility
at given levels of initial mobility, but has no additional predictive
power among the old.
6. Net Age Effects in Mobily
Although they do not appear in the NLSregressionof Table 5, age
effects (coefficients of experience) on mobility are present in the
MID regressions in panel C and were seen in the decline of mobility rates
at fixed levels of tenure when the older cohort was compared to the younger
(Table 2). The economics of this downward shift in tenure curves may be
found in the more traditional aspects of labor mobility: Job change is
a response to higher wage levels beckoning elsewhere as well as a search
for specific investment opportunities.
For a given wage gain, the supply response would diminish with working
age (at given levels of tenure) since the payoff period declines. Such
effects, however, would not become pronounced until late in the working
life, especially in view of positive and not negligible discounting.Emphasis on finite life (working age) cannot produce a convex experience—
turnover profile, nor can it rationalize the fact that the observed net
age declines (!)occurrelatively early in the working life. However,
the gain from mobility may decline over the life cycle not because of
the declining payoff period but because of rising costs: Costs of
geographic mobility are sizable and rise with family size and the presence
of school—age children.
-
Ageeffects are, indeed, more important in migration than in local
job mobility. The decline in migration with age s(x) is steeper than
the decline in local job mobility: One-third of young compared to less
than10 percent of olderjob changers migrate. But the greater costs in
migration include also costs due to locational specificities which exist
in addition to job specificity, so stronger "pure aging" is not the only
reason for a sharper age decline in migration than in local job mobility:
Tenure effects which reflect both job and location specificities are
indeed, sharper for migrants.
Another set of age factors, unrelated to location, may operate in
the early years of work experience: The range of quality of jobs and of
the job match cannot be ascertained by mere search, and some knowledge
must be acquired by actual experimentation. Also, job training and opport-
unities for investment in general human capital may present themselves
sequentially in different firms. Beyond the first decade of working life,
we may expect that human capital investors who eventually find a reasonably
compatible work place develop a strong attachment to the job.
7.Tenureand Mobility Effects in theWageFunction
Specificcapital investments imply tenure effects on wages which
cause the tenure effects in mobility. Wage heterogeneity due to differ-— 26—
entialspecificities similarly produce some of the heterogeneity in
mobility. Consequently, we should observe tenure effects in addition
to general work experience effects in wage functions. Moreover, these
effects may be exaggerated in empirical estimates in view of interpersonal
diversity in specific investhient behavior.
Information on job mobility can and should be built into the standard
earnings function. The inclusion of the tenure variable should capture
returns to specific (non-transferable) capital accumulation permitting
theexperience term to measure returns to general (transferable) capital
accumulation.Information on prior mobility should also be useful in
correcting for heterogeneity bias. The explanatory power of the enriched
wage function ought to be enhanced.
The coefficients of experience (X) in the standard wage function,
which includes only education in addition to the experience terms, reflect




The standard wage function has an upward sloping and concave ex-
perience profile (the concavity is more pronounced when w =logwage)
in cross sections and in longitudinal data)8 Its slope has been derived
in human capital theory and in econometric studies. In view of (2a) it is
incorrect to interpret the coefficients of experience !asmeasures of
dx
returns to general human capital stocks. Such returns are measured by
that is by coefficients of experience, when tenure is included in
(x
the wage function. Clearly .!overstates.!if specific capital
dx— 27—
isof any importance. The experience coefficients in the earnings func-
tion which omits tenure is an upward biased measure of returns to gen—
era]. hiin capital accumulated on the job.
It is interesting to note according to (2a), that even if no gen-
era]. capital were accumulated in the work career, wages would still rise
over the life—cycle and, as a group average, the wage profile would
tend to be concave so long as the tenure wage profile is concave.. and
dTdoes not increase over the life cycle.
Wage functions with tenure variables w (XT) can be estimated in
hgeneous groups without bias (honegeneity defined as the same tenure
wage profile) ,but no such groups can be defined a priori: In the
presence of heterogeneity the tenure coefficient is likely to be exag-
gerated, as in the case of mobility, and corrections need to be de—
greater vised. More precisely, the bias arises becauseA specificity pro-
duces larger discrepancies between the marginal product in the firm
and the opportunity wage-V-W—W+W,where W is the spe-
cific return to the worker, and We to the employer, andas well as
W differ among workers and firms •affects the length of tenure.
It is plausible for W and We to be positively correlated, because a
fruitful match has to be recognized as such by both parties. There-
fore W is a. good index of tandthe tenure-wage coefficient which
attempts to measure W5 is likely to be correlated with expected
tenure •
19Heterogeneityin W5 is thus likely to produce an upward
bias in the estimates of tenure effects on wages, that is of returns
to specific worker invesents •Anadditional source of bias could
result from a positive correlation between general and specific— 28—
investments:Here steeper tenure—wage curves would start at higher lev-
els.To the extent that general returns to capital (Wa) are not fully
measured (standardized)by regression variables, the bias will arise.
Of course, positive tenure coefficients need not reflect wage growth
in the firm. Higher wage levels (not growing with tenure) for the same
labor in some firms create incentives to stay there longer. Although
transitional, this relation is likely to be widespread in a dynamic
economy as an equilbrating phenomenon. Such supply adjustments to
shifting demands are most likely to involve younger people whose mob-
ility is less costly especially in terms of specific capital losses.
Note, that in this case prior mobility is not a good index of wage
heterogeneity. Similar and more long—lasting effects can be created
by above equilibrium union wages and nepotism.
Can information on prior mobility be used in the wage function as
an index of relevant heterogeneity, that is of individual differences in
W and consequently in the wage-tenure coefficient? The answer is less
clear in the wage equation than in the mobility equation. Positive
serial correlation in mobility makes the link between length of tenure
and mobility almost definitional whatever the urce of heterogeneity
in mobility. The problem for the wage equation is that bias in the tenure
coefficient is only in part due to heterogeneity in specific capital and
the latter is responsible for only a part of the heterogeneity in mob-
ility. Thus prior mobility may be a weak instrument for elimination
of heterogeneity bias. Its role in wage formation is nevertheless of
interest to our study.— 29—
and
Table 6 presents wage functions of the younger ,'olderNLS men, andof
all men inMID. The independent variables are the same as in the mobility
functions in Table 5. The dependent variable is the logarithmic wage°
and row (1) is the "standard" wage function where the independent var-
iables are education and experience. In the next row the tenure terms
are added. In the third row we add the prior mobility variable and in
the last row we observe its interaction with experience.
In the young men's panel the introduction of tenure reduces the
experience coefficient: At this stage (on average five years of exper-
ience), wages grow 6.6 percent per year of experience (1st row of Table
6); wages grow 4.3 percent as returns to general post-school human
capital accumulation (2nd row of Table 6) and 2.3 percent due to specific
capital accumulation. The tenure coefficients are large and significant.
Prior mobility is not related to current wages and does not affect the
tenure coefficits.The coefficient of the interaction variable is
surprisingly positive but quite small, and its intr3duction raises the
tenure coefficient slightly. Apparently differences in early mobility
of young men are not indicative of future differences in specific capital
investments nor do they capture differences in wage levels which are
positively related to the length of current tenure.
In the wage function for NLSoldermen the experience profile is a
plateau, but tenure slopes are positive (and concave) though much flatter
than for young men.21 Still, the observed tenure effect is biased up-
ward. Introduction of prior mobility cuts the linear term in half and
reduces its significance. We may conclude that repeated mobility at an
advanced stage of the life—cycle is an indicator of persistent turnover,,
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































has a negative effect, showing that
frequentmovers have lower wages than stayers,given education,
experience,andcurrenttenure •Thisis in contrast to the youngwhose
pastmobilitydidnotimply a downward selection.Wemayconcludethat
intensiveearly mobility—about a half of the firstdecadein ourNLS
data—isnotnecessarilyan inverseindexof longer—run tendencies to
acquirespecificcapital or an indexofinability to acquire a goodjob
match. It mayevenbe a positive index of efficiency in wage ga.ins by
movingaossfirorof greater intensity of search for an optimal
career.
Takentogether the findings in both NLSpanelsshow that tenure effects
on wages are significant,reflecting the firm—specific component of wage
progress on the job. This component accounts for about, one third of
wage growth per year in the early part of working life. At young ages,
past mobility does not clearly distinguish tendencies toward firm specific
human capital behavior. It does so, however, at older ages. At that
stage lesser specific investments also result in lower wages, apparently
as a result of slower growth over the past decades.22
The wage function in the MID panel, which covers all working ages,
indicates that on average (and in mid—career) the firm specific component
accounts for 20-25 percent of wage growth per year (difference between the
X—coefficjents in lines 1 and 2, panel c). Prior mobility is negatively
related to wages. The interaction term is also negative suggesting that
men who continue to be frequent movers in the third decade of their
working lives have both lower wages and flatter experience profiles of
wages. The inclusion of prior mobility variables reduces the tenure
slope by close to 20 percent. Thus, heterogeneity biases the tenure—
wage slope coefficient upward by about 25 percent, half as much as it biased
the tenure-mobility slope (panel C of Table 5).— 33—
7. Tenure, Exuerience and Mobility: Additional Remarks
We used. the generalized term "specific hian capital behavior" to
cover both the informational theory of job matching and the theory of
specific han capital invesent. The former is a necessary
condition for the latter, and both are required for cpleteness.
There is another and popular view that the reality of tenure ef-
fects on mobility and on wages is largely institutional. The effects
we n1yzed are seen as "seniority rights" which include job security,
pension rights, vacations, and seniority based pay and prortion advan-
tages. But the distinction is superficial. The "rights" themselves
may well derive from htan capital specificities in the presence or
absence of formal, especially union, regulations. Indeed, recent re-
search shows that tenure turnover profiles decline and tenure wage
profiles grow as much and more U) in the non—union as in the union
23 sector. -
Inthe past, experience coefficientswere often crudely inter-
preted as on-the-job general investments. In the wage function which
includes tenure the experience coefficients effectively segregate
returns to general hiznan capital investments, but they contain both
returns to on-the—job general investment and across jobs wage gains due
to mobility (but not to tenure). These across—jobs wage changes are
positive in purposive quits especially in migration, but are often
negative when job change results fr layoff, "exogenous" quit, and job
dissatisfaction •2434 -
Overthe life—cycle the effects of mobility on wages become increas-
ingly less favorable at least as measured by money wages. Quits, migration,
and occupational upgrading predominate in mobility of the young, but they
become relatively unimportant at older ages. Since the frequency of job
change declines over the life cycle for reasons already spe'led out, the
mobility component of wage growth declines over the life cycle both
as a result of declines in the size and in the frequency of wage gains
across firms. This is another aspect of the well-known concavity of the
experience profile of wages.
Some models elevate the across—firm wage change to a single explan—
ation of the typical concave life—cycle wage profile: The worker is
envisaged as moving up a fixed wage offer distribution over his lifetime.
Successful on-the-job search results in off—the-job wage growth. With
a fixed wage offer distribution turnover declines with labor market
experience. Thus older workers have a higher wage and a smaller prob-
ability of future separation.25
Although they produce concavity in the wage profiles, such models
are quite inadequate as major explanations of magnitudes of wage growth
over the life cycle ():Ina calculation based on the Coleman— dx
ssidataBarte].(1975) shows that nomore than 25 percent of personal.
wage growth can be attributed to across—fir wage changes during the
first 15 years of work experience, when mobility is most pronounced.
Themodei.s,therefore,neglect the bulk of the phenomenontheyare try-
ingto exol.ajn. Moreover, concavity inthe wage profile does notre-
quire job mobility, in hin capital. theory, or in fact: Borj as (1975)
found the typically pronounced concavityi.n wageprofiles of NLS workers
who spent all of their workinglife in asinglefirm.— 35—
- 'Althoughcrude,our estimatesof tenureandexperi-
ence wage effects suggest that about23 percent of life—cycle wage
growth,whichabstracts fromeconomy-widechanges, is due to specific
capitalinvestment. Taken together, theestimatesprovide a convolete
though very rough decomposition of life-timewage growth: About 25
20—
percent ofitis due to interfimobility, anotherA25percent to fi
specific experience, and Over.. 50 percent is due to general (trans-
ferable) experience.'
Perhapsthe best way to s'mazize theLife—cyclerelation between
mobility and wages is to recognize that initial(firstdecade ?) job
searchhas two major purposes: to gainexperience, wages, and skills
by moving across fi, and to find,sooneror later,a suitable job 'in
andcrow whichone cansettleAf alongtime. The life-cycledecline in mobil-
ity is, in part, evidenceof successful initialmobility, which is corrobo-
rated by corresponding life—cyclegrowth in wages.
Inbothage grouns, stayers and successfulsearchers growfaster
than unsuccessfulsearchersor "non—investing" movers. However, acom-
parison of movers and stayersputssuccessful searchers in the category
of movers among theyoung, but in the categoryof stayers(theymoved
whenyounger)among the old. As a result, comparisons ofstayers and
moversshow that young movers doas well or better thanstayers, but
tiltitnate stayers showsuperior wage growth arid higherwage levels in the
later decades.-36-
FOOTNOTES
1See,especially the most recent contribution of Heckinan (1977 and
1978), and Jovanovic (1978). Recent work of sociologists, including
their own, is reviewed by Singer and Spilerman (1976).
essay
2ThisAserves as a partial analytical underpinning for an ongoing
NBER study of Lifetime Earnings and Labor Mobility carried out by Bartel,
Borjas, and Mincer. (Some of the ideas developed in this essay are
pursued formally in a more specialized focus by B. Jovanovic in this
volume and elsewhere.)
3
The subject of women's labor mobility is reserved for separate
study.
4For analysis of geographic mobility see Barte]. (1978) and Mincer
(1978)
5BLS, Special Labor Force Report No. 35, "Job Mobility in 1961",
Table A.
6This is in contrast to the ELS data of Table 1 and may be peculiar
to the NLS sample.- 37-
71nhis work, Jobanovic (1978) has shown that job matching pro-
cesses produce downward sloping tenure separation functions and up-
ward sloping tenure-wage functions. Investments of employers and
workers in their mutual association are a corollary. We use the language
of specific capital to cover the combined phenomena.
8For a theoretical treatment of this distinctionsee Mortensen (1978)
9We may note that even if returnsto specific capital accumulation,
and in particular W did not decelerate with tenure, but grew in a linear
fashion, the resulting growth of acceptance wages would nevertheless
lead to decelerating declines in the probability of quit, given a
declining upper tail of the wage äffer distribution.
10
We must be careful, however, not to assert the converse: by
itself, inertia does not bring about specific investments.
11For evidence and referencessee 3. Mincer (1974).
12The deterministictreatment is for expository convenience only.
See Part II for a more formal and more specialized analysis of the
stochastic process.
13Perhapsa simple way of illustrating the conclusionthat
dx
is larger with than without tenure dependence, is to consider a case
in which we go from none to some tenure dependence. Let the mean tenure
in the group be T and the overall turnover rate s. Then after apassage
of a year the (l—s) stayers have increased tenure by oneyear, while
the s movers, without tenure dependence, lost, onaverage T years of
tenure. The net change is therefore (1-s) -sT,which approaches dx- 38—
zerosince T approaches (!- 1).Now, let s remain the same, but the
process become taure—dependent. In this case, the average thnure lost
by movers is < T since proportionately more of them are drawn from
low tenure classes. Consequently the net gain in tenure =(1-s)-
dx
sT > (1 —s)—sT. m
14Theorexn 2, Part II.
15Cf. Theorem 3 in Part II. Such a decline in the variance need not
be inconsistent with a widening of differences in mobility rates.
16The best known work is that of Blumen, Kogan, and Mccarthy (1955).
For a recent exposition and critique see Singer and Spilerman (1976).
For those men whose current tenure started before the initial
year of reported prior mobility (1965 for the old NLS, 1966 for the young
NLS, and 1968 for MID), no information on PM is available (12% of young
NLS, 62% of the old NLS, and about 50% in MID). As a check on the results
in Table 5 which implicitly assigns values PM =0to those whose tenure
is too long, we used dummy variables on the complete samples, and we also
replicated the regressions of Table 5 on the subsamples which contained
information on prior mobility. The results were quite similar to those in
Table S with one interesting feature that was already mentioned: The
tenure coefficients for the old men in NLS (with short tenure in the sub-
sample) were as steep as for the young and the inclusion of PM reduc
the slope by a relatively small amount as it did for the young.
18The longitudinal evidence is less familiar. See Borjas and
Mincer (1978) reporting Coletnan—Rossi data, and Anderson, Balcer, and
Diamond (1976) on the Continuous Work History Sample.- 39—
1Cf.discussion in Part II, following Theorem 3.
20Dollar wage equations, not shown here, show similarpatterns, but
weaker predictive power.
21This is true also inthe sample with T < 8, in contrast to the
short-tenure mobility equation (see note 17).
22Supporting evidence is shown in ti Bartel andBorjas paper in
this volume, as well as in previous research by Borjas.Borjas (1975)
classified the older NLSmeninto movers and stayers. The latter were
defined by the fact that their current job was the longestever. Educ-
ation and experience were only slightly different in the twogroups.
The movers had lower wages (about 25 percent) and flatterexperience
profiles.
23Freeman (1978), Borjas (1978), andothers. The flatter union
tenure slopes have been analyzed as effects of union policy. We
suggest that theyniay also reflect lesser heterogeneity in the union
compared to the non—union sector.
24See Bartel andBorjas, this volume.
25Burdett (1973), Sorensen(1974). Jovanovic (1978a) is an adapt-
ationof Burdett, which allows for on-the—job humancapital accumulation.
It is doubtful, however, that the assumption of a fixedwage offer
distribution can be maintained for workers whose skillsare growing and
changing over the life-cycle.PART II
labor Mobility as a Stochastic Process
In this part we treat labor mobility and wage growth
over the life cycle as related stochastic processes.We first
focus on th evolution of these processes for a given worker,
and we interpret our formulation within the context of exis-
ting theories of turnover and of wage growth and list some of
the implications of these theories. Next we take up the
question of unmeasured heterogeneity in the population,and the
problem of sample selection over time,known as the 'mover -
stayer"problem. A remarkably simple result is proved in
Theorem 3whichrelates the behavior of a heterogeneous
groupto the behavior of the individualmembers of that
group.Ininterpreting the result,we pay particular attention
/tothe on-the-job training hypothesis.Lastly,we describean
estimationmethod which may be applied to estime..te various
parametrizationsofthe separations and wage equations.-.2-.
Definitions:
z —parameterindexing aparticular worker
x—- theworker's labor market experience
t —theworker's job tenure -
x0
—marketexperience at whichtheworker started on
his current job,sothatateach momentintime,
zo+t—x
Let
z)E Probabilitythat for a worker of type z,
•
job tenuredoes not exceed t on a job which
started at
Let f(tfx0,z) —F/tbe the associated density,andlet(t, x0, z)
be the 9iazardfunctions ofthis distribution,definedby—f/Cl-F).
Thenis the conditiona2density ofjob separation at tenure t, given
thatatenurelevelt has beenattained. The definitions of$andf
içly thatFmay be written as
t
P(tJx0, z) —1.—ezp
—IiCy,x0, z) dy] (3)
0
Thedevelopment thus far is perfectly general. Theremaybea positive
probability that a job-episode never terminates, in whichcaseurn F(tlx,z)<1,i.e.,P s(y, x, z)dy <
0
Itshould be noted that Fdeterminesuniquelyand vice versa. Since
f .o,.oso that F is non—decreasing.
e purpose of this section is to draw some parallels betieen
wageratesand separation probabilities. Let w Ct, x,z) be the mathe-
matical expectation of the wage that worker z, with experience x+t,
and tenure t will receive. It may be noted that both w and s are mathe-
matical expectations conditional upon t, x, and z.
Hereafter it is assumed that when a particular job episode
terminates, it is iediately followed by a new job episode. That is,
there are assumed to be no unemployment spells or spells of market non-
participation. Given this assumption, consider now the special case in
which /x—3F/x0
—0.Then each job episode is identically dis-
tributed. If, in addition, the job episodes are also assume to be
independently as well as identically distributed, then turnover becnes
a pure renewal process (see Feller (1966) Cli. II]. In what follows, we
study processes that are re general than the renewal process, and ucre
general than semi—Markov processes.
Let a(x, z). be. the probability density that worker z will experi-
ence a job—separation at the point in time at which his market experi-
ence is equal to x.(For the special case where turnover is a renewal
process, a(x,z) is known as the renewal density.) A.lso let h(t)x, z)
be the probability density that a worker with market experience x will
have current job tenure equal to t. Note that for this statent to be—4— --
e
true,the rker must have experienced a job separation at exactly x —t




a(x—t,z) (1 —P(tlx—t,z)] if 0 ..t<
Then
* X,
(5)a(x,z) s(x, o,z) (l—F(xlo, z)] +Is(t, x—t,z) h(tlx, z)dt
0
a x* —s(x,o, z) [l—F(xlo, z)] +Is(t, x—t, z) a(x—t, z) 0
(l—?(tIx—t,z)]dt
Definey Cx,z) asthe mathatica3. expectation of worker z's waqe con-
ditionedonly on hismarket experience. Then
•x
(6)y(x,z) — (x, o,z) (3. —P(xlo,z)] +I(t,x —t,z)
0
a(x—t,z) (1 —F(tlx-t,z)] dt
Now define two new functions





(wheresubscriptsdenotepartialderivatives).Making thesubstitution into (5) and (6).
x
(7) a(x, z)s(x,x,z)(1F(xlo,z)J + I s(t, x,z)
0








There are several reasons for choosing this approach. First, the
deteninistic earnings—function approach (see, for exanple, Mincer
(1974)] is a special case of the above formulation. In the earnings func-
tion approach turnover is not considered explicitly so that job—tenure is
not included in the regressions. Such regression equations are here
interpreted as expectations conditional on x and on the measured compo-
nent of z, and the expression that characterize such conditional expec-
tations are provided in equations (8) and (U). A set of sufficient
conditions under which the conditional expectation of the wage is a
monotonicaUy increasing function of experience is provided below.
Second, thà job—matching theory of turnover as developed in
Jovanovic (1978 )is fully consistentwith the aboveformulation when
the latter is restricted to s —w0 for aU (x, t, z) so that the
'C 'C
turnover process is predicted by the theory to be one of pure renewal.
The key assumotions in generating such a result are a constant rate of
discount, and infinite horizon, and an assumption about the job—search—6—
process that makes the latter "pure exterience search"in the terminology
of Nelson (1970). The model also implies w >0for all t, and <0
for large enough t and perhaps for all t.
Two other search models that explicitly look at the implications
for life cycle mobility are those of Burdett (1973) and of Jovanovic
(l97$a). Both models involve the worker ving up a fixed wage—offer
distribution over their lifetime, with search of the "pure search" kind
(Nelson's terminology again). Both models imply that in the absenceof
on-the—job training, s <0and w >0while s w —0for given x.
When firm—specific h"" capital investment is introduced (Jovanovic
(1978a) 3,thelatter prediction changes to s <0and w >0for all
workers except the very old for whom s >0and w <0as they allow
their human capital to depreciate toward the end of their lifetime.
General on—the—job training raises wages, implying w >0given
a monotonic increase in general training over time. Since general
training raises the worker1 a productivity in many firms, it is not ex-
pected to affect turnover, and therefore s -0is consistent with
>0and with the presence of general training. A somewhat different
argument asserts that the presence of general training isthe cause of
turnover at younger ages, because it may be optimal for the training
to be acquired in several different firms and such turno'er is planned
in advance. To the extent that such turnover is significant, (and
little evidence is available to support its significance), it may pro-
duce non—monotonic effects on s(t, x, z) for young workers as t and x
increase.Next, define
- t
(9) aCt,x, z)f h(rlx,z) d'r .0
0
so that H(o,x, z) —0and H(x,x, ) —F(xfo,z).Then integrating
by parts in (7) and (8) one obtains
'C
(10) a(x,z) — s(x,x, z) —fs(t, x, z) B(t, x, z) dt
and
'C
(11) y(x, z) —w(x,x, z) —fw(t, x z) H(t, x,z) dt
0
Equations (10)and(11) should be cczipared for their identicalstructure.
Thefollowingresults follow directly from equations (10)and(11),
andare presented in Theorem 1:
Theorem 1: Let< 0and,0for all values of the arguments.
Then
a(o, z)9(0, 0, z) , y(o,z) —w(o,o, z)
— •o, z) + o,z) ,
z) o, z) +w(o,o, z)
andforany x >0 ,a(x, z)> s(x,x, z)and
y(x,z) <dx,x, z)—8—
Proof: The assertions follow from the observation that
H(t,x, z) >0for any t >0,and from H(o,o, z) —0.
Next, consider the special case in whichs
-0,aswculd be trueif
turnoverwas a pure renewal process •Wethen have the folling
theorem:
Theorem 2: Let s Ct, x, z) be independent ofx.Then if sc0 for all
Cx, t, z) then a<0for allCx, z).
Proof: Differentiating with respect to x in equation (10) and applying
theassmnptionthat 0, yields
x
aCx, z)— sCx, x, z) (.—?(xo, z)] —fsCt, x, z) x t 0
H(t,x, z) dt
and since, by assumption,s
<0,itissufficient to prove that H<0
for all Ct, x, z). But since sdoesnot depend on x, neither does F.
Therefore,H(t, x, z) —Ia(x— y,z) l—?(yx
—y,z)] dy.
Therefore, H(t, x, z) <0if aCx —y,z) <0for all yc(0, x).
But then, a(x, z) <0for all x if there exists an c>0no matter
how n1l such that a(x,z) <0for xe(o, e). But such an cmust
exist if aCx,z)is continuousat zero, because by Theorem 1,
a(O,z) — o,z) +°' o,z) <0.(The last inecualityfol-
lowsby the assumptions of the theorem.) Thiscompletes the proof of
the theorem.—9--
Intuitively, one expects that Theorem 2 should extend to the case
where s <0and s <0,that is, to the case where the separationpro—
pens ity declines with both tenure and market experience, and that the
declinein the separation propensity considered as a function of market
experience alone (a (x, z)], should, if anything, be reinforced. While
this conjecture may be tzie, an attet at proving italong the lines
of the proof of Theorem 2 fails, becausecan not be signed.
Theorem 2 asserts that the renewal density declinesnotcnically
if the inter—event waiting-time distributionpossesses a znotonica.lly
decreasing hazard rate. Note that a parallel result formonotonically
increasing haza.rd rate distribution does not hold. That is,s >0
everywhere does not imply that a>0for all x, andan attempt at a
proof along the lines of the proof of Theorem 2 isquicklyseen to fail
(and a counterexaxnple is given in Br.m (1940)]
It should benotedthat y(x,z)is the wage—experience profile for
ahomogeneous groupoftypez. By differentiating in equation (8),
conditions may be derived under which the wage exper ence profile will
be increasing and concave(y >0,y<0)for each homogeneous group.
These conditions involve restrictions on both w(t, x, z) andon
s(t,x, z). For example, one set of sufficient conditions for a
monotonically increasing wage—experience profile Cy >0)is: 50,
<0,w >0,w>0and w >0,as may be verifiedby direct differ-
entiationin (8) (and by applying the result of Theorem 2 which states
that <0and —0jointly imply a <0everywhere). Assuming, that
—0,is theoretically consistent with assuming that >a—the
accumulation of purely general on-the—job training raises the worker's— 10—--
Productivityin all firm byanequal aunt, and itraiseshis wage
(hence w > 0) but is not expected to have any effect on his separation
propensity(hence s 0). Sufficient conditions for concavity of the
wage—experience profile may also be derived but turn out to be much more
complicated.
Let T(x, a) be the mathematical expectation of current tenure.
The latter is distributed according to (4), and therefore,
x x
C12) T(x, a) —x(l—F(xlo,a)]+ f th(tlx,z)dt —x—/H(t, a, z)dt
0 0
The second equality follows after integration by parts. Since H > 0,
T(x,a) can not exceed x. Differentiating with respect to x,
x
(13) T (x,a) —1—F(xlo,z) —IH Ct, x, z)dt x 0 X
so that 1(0, a) —1.If turnover is a pure renewal process withs < 0
everywhere,then from Theorem 2, H>0, and> 0 for all x, in other
words, the average current job tenure will always be increasing for a
cohort of workers as their marketexperience increasesunder these
assumptions.
Let t1, t2, ...bethesequenceofcompletedjob durations. Then
the distributionfunction forthelength of the th job episode is
n—i
F(t Et4, a). The t are therefore neither independent nor iden—
flj_1
• .1
tically distributed random variables solong as the aging effect, s
isnot zero. Ifthere isno aging effect, then eachjob—episode has— 11—
thesa distribution, and if, in addition, one assumes that the job-
episode durations are independently distributed, then turnover is a
pure renewal process. Let n(x, z) be the nber of job changes (the
nmther of completed episodes or the number of "prior ves") on the
experience interval (0, x).Then
-
x
(14) E n(x, z) —fa(t, z) dt
0
To see this, note that a(x, z) Ax + 0 ((Ax) 23 is the probability that
exactly one job change will occur on the interval Cx,x +Ax). The
expression in equation (25) is the s of these probabilities over such
disjoint intervals as At tends to zero. Dividing both sides of (14)
through by x, taking the limit as x tends to infinity and applying
L'Hopital's rule, one obtains
urna(x,z) —urn En(x, z) x.
a2 Ofcourse, (En(x, z}] —a(x,z), and[n(x, z)] a Cx, z). X ax
X
Therefore, a notonica1ly decreasing experience profile of turnover im-
plies concavity of the expected number of vestreatedas a function
of experience.
Exanle: a pure renewal rocess:
Let F bethemixed exponential distribution:
1-zt—(z+b)t F(tlx, z) —1—(a +e— 12—
sothat no aging effects exist. Then
f(tjx, z) —4 [zet+(z + b)e+ b)t1
and
s(t,x,z) — bt 1+a
2 bt
x, z) b e
2 (1 +et)
The slope of the separation function is in this case independent of z.
If b0, s —0and so b is a parater denoting the extent of duration
dependence. Then let
1 1 1 T(x,z) —2z+z+b
<
z
The renewal equation (5) has for this case explicitly been solved by
Ba.rtholew (1972) to yield
a(x,z) —[T(x,z)] + (z + —T(x,z)])e
+
2(Z+b)Z_ b2e+)C 2z+b 2(2z+b)
so that
2 b
Cx, z) ——e +)x— 13 —
Ifthere is no duration dependence with tenure Cb—0),then separations
also do not decline when considered as a function ofage. Notice also
that
a Cx,z) — — x a(x,z) >0 xz
so that although the s Ct, x,z)cl.2rves are parallel in z, —0),
the age curves are not—they diverge. The relationship between the





Thedivergence of ageprofiles thereforecan be explainednot only
by divergencesin levels of specifiChan capital (asargued in Part I
of this paper) butalso as a purelYstatistical pheneflOU.
In this case,convexity of s(t, x,z) in t impliesconvexity of
aCx, z) in x. Asb (the dt ation ependencoparameter tends tozero,
both a(z, z) and s(t, x,z) tend to a constant,z.
GrouP Relatiofls hipe
The in ividual.5Peif ic parameter z is byassumPtiofl imobserrable.
It is an "incidentalparameter." The populationdistribution of z is
assined to be p(z)with mean i and variance The n_degeneracY
of this distrib.ti0flgives rise to thedynamiC version ofthe sample
selection problemstudied below.
Upon enteringthe labor market, aworker is asstuned tobe a rndom
drawing from thedistzibutiohl p (z). Onthe other band, aworker who is
starting out on a job oththan his first, at amarketeXPers level
x >0,is not repreSefltati'of the entire populationin the sense that
he can not beconsidered a random drawingfrom the distributiofl p(z).
Although p (z) isterpreted to be anunmeasured personal charac-
teristic, it is likelyto be correlatedwith measured personalcharaC
teristiCs such as yearsof schooling, race, sexand so on. The un
measured variability inseparation propenSitias
decreases as thenumber
of personal charaCteXiSt5held constant increaSes,which is another
way of sayingthat part of thevariance of z is"explained0 by the
variance of a set ofpersonal charaCteriSti
(Note that this is quite
different from thestatement that thevariance of theconditionaldistribution is never greaterthanthe variance of the marginaldistri-
bution. The latter statement is false.)
The objective now is to characterizethe distribution of z condj-.
tional upon x and t. Letp (z x)bethe distribution of z whichapplies
to workers who are juststartinga new job at experience level x.
Applying Bayes' Theorem,
a(x, z) p(z)
> J /a(x,z) p(z)dz (15) pCzjx) —
p(z) x —0
p(z x)is a continuous function of xexcept at x0.(Thecontinuity
of p(z Ix)atx >0followsifa(x,z) is continuous.)
Now let (z x, t) be theprobabiLity density that the worker is
of type z given job tenure t andexperience x +t.At the time he
joined his current fitheworker was drawn from the popu.ttio
p(zlx). Applying Bayes' Theoremagain,
[1. —F(tlx,z)]p(zjx (16) p(zx,t)
—Ftjx°z)] p(zjx)dz
Equation (16) followsbecause 1. —F(tx,z) is just the probability
that the worker of type z will, attaintenure tina job which he started
at experience1ev x.
Writing'(tIx0,z) instead of (t,x0,z) (thereby emphasizing
the nature of the conditioning), let
(17) s(t,x) I s(tx, z)(zx, t) dz— 16—
bethe probability that the worker will experience aseparation at tenure







where(x0, t) isthe mathematicalexpectation of the wage given x0and
:hare
a2 (Ix, t)is the varianceàf i(ti x, z) in the population
p(zjx,t)and where Cov(s,wfx0,t) is the covarjanceof A A . A s(tIx0,z)andw(tx0,z) inthe population p(zIx0,t).Before
proving this theorem, we elaborate on themeaning of its asser-
tions.When t is increased by one unit whilex0 is held constant,
tenure and experience both increaseby one unit. Therefore,St
is the sumofthe tenure effect and of thepure age effect, and
similarly for wt •Inwords, the first assertion of
the theorem may be expressed as
•the slope of
the average separation rate is equal to theaverage of the individual
slopes, minus the varianceofthe separation rates in the currentpopu-
lation (zJx, t).Thisresult isan extension of an earlier result
due to Barlow, Marshall and Proschan(1963).Their result states that
mixtures of decreasing hazard—rate distributionsalsopossess decreasing
hazard rates.
Suppose that there are no trueage or tenure effects on
separations so that t(tIx0,z) =0everywhere. Then,— 17 —
A • -
st(t,x0)
=— -(sIx0,t)so that the group separation rate declines
although the individual separation rates are constant.Further-
more, (t,x0) would in this special case be convex in t (which
would be consistent with the evidence presented in Table 2) if
O(x0,t) declines monotonically with t. For a wide class of dist-
ributions p(zx0) one would expect such a monotonic decline be-
cause the selection out of the sample as t increases is such that
"movers" are (on avrrage) selected out leaving behind only the
"stayers" so that the sample of those left behind becomes increa-
singly more homogeneous.But need not decline monotonically
as is demonstrated by the following example0Assume that at any x0,
p(zx0) is such that z takes on only two values, say I and 0,
and that the z =1workers have .a higher separation propensity
than do the z =0workers.Assuine that the initial ( t =0) sample
is such that nine-tenths of the workers are z =1types and that
the remaining one-tenth are z =0types.Then the initial variance
of z is (1 —.9).9=.09.As tenure increases, the population pro-
portions shift towards the stayers, and the variance of z increases
steadily up to .25, at which point the population proportions are
equal.Thereafter, the variance declines monotonically to zero.Of
course,a monotonic decline would occur even in this example if
the initial proportions happened to be equal,or were weighted in
favor of stayers.
Acoording to the first part of equation (18), the change in
the group separation rate is always an overstatement (in the nega-
tive direction) of the average of the individual chariges.However,
the same is not true of the group wage-change because the covariance
term in the second part of equation (18) may be either positive— 18 —
ornegative. The relevant question is whether a "mover"
(for whom (t,x) -(tx0,z)is negative) would expect to
receive higher or lower wages than a "stayer" at a certain te-
nure- level given that it was optimal for both to remain in the
firm up to that time. A theory which predicts that a worker
will separate from a job on which wages paid to him were low
relative to his prior expectations implies nothing about this
question.
The implications of human capital theory for the sign
and magnitude of Cov(,Jx0,t) are ambiguous.In part I we empha-
sized the role of firm-specific human capital in generating a
wedge between the worker's productivity in his current firm
and his productivity elsewhere.Consider the polar case in which
the ratio of general to firm-specific training is fixed and
constant across workers,but that workers differ in the total
amount of training that they undertake.Suppose that z is an
index inversely related to the worker's propensity to invest in
on-the-job training.Under these assumptions, a higher propen-
sity to invest also implies a higher investment in specific
training, s,o that (tx0,z) > 0. Assume that z is not core-
lated with unmeasured ability components.Then, since invest-
ment in training involves foregone earnings early on in return
for higher earnings later,this implies that w(tIx,z) >0for
young workers (for whom x0 and t are small), and w(tlx0,z) <0
for older workers0Therefore Cov(,x,t) is positive for
the young and negative for the old workers.
Suppose instead, however, that the total amount of training
across individuals (with given x0 and t and other observable cha-— 19 —
racteristics)is cènstant while only the ratio of general to
specific training varies positively with z.Now, high-z workers
have higher separation propensities because their training is
general in nature rather than firm-specific.In view of the
well-known argument (see Becker (1975)) that general training is
financed by the workers, such workers earn lower wages initially,
and higher wages later on, than do "stayers" whose training is
more firm-specific in nature.(Again,this conclusion depends
on the assumption that the preference for the type of training
is not related to unmeasured ability differences).The implication
now is that Cov(,x0,t) is negative for the young, and
positive for the old workers.
Neither polar case is expected to obtain in practice.Bo-th
the total amount and the composition of the training may be ex-
pected to vary systematically with z.But which doninates ? The
wage-function estimates reported in Table 6 strongly suggest
thatthe dominant variation is in the total amountoftraining.
In both parts of this table,this inference in made by comparing
thesecond line with the forth line in part A ofTable 6,and the se-
cond line with the third in part B. The variables PM and NIM are indexe:
of past mobility and are corelated with (ttx,z).By definition,
z is the unmeasured component of heterogeneity,and the inclusion
of PM and NIM therefore has the effect of reducing the absolute
value of Cov(,sIx0,t).In both parts of Table 6 there appears
to be an effect of this reduction.The wage growth, measured as the
sum of the coefficients on X and T, increases for the young men
when NIM is included, and decreases for the older men when PM is
included in the regression, and these changes are consistent with
the first polar case,but not the second,as is clear from equation
(18).— 20—
Proof ofTheorem3:Substitutingfor p into (17),
If(tjx,z) p(zlx)dz





[1—F(tx,z)]p(zIx)If(tx,z)p(zlx )dz (20) + ° ° °
(1(1— F)pdzj2
— (— s(tlx,z) + s(t, x)] p(zlx, t)
Multiplyingboth sides by Ct Ix, z)andintegratingbothsidesover z,
Is(tx,z) (zjx, t) (t, x)2 —Is(tx,z)2 dz
(21)
—(E(s)]2—E(s2)——a2(sjx, t)
and differentiating withrespectto tin equation(17) and using equa-
tion (21), one obtains the first assertion of the theorem which has therefore
/
beenproved.Next,
w(x, t)—Iw(tjx, z) p(zjx,t)dz
and differentiating withrespect to t,— 21—
t(X,t)
— pdz+f w(tjx, z)[(t,x )—
0 0
s(tlx,z)] p(zlx, t)dz
wherethe second equality follows in view of equation (20),
and this completes the proof of the theorem.
An Estimation Procedure2
The following estimation procedure exploits the property of
p(zx) (defined in (15)) of having two different functional forms,
implying, in turn, twodifferentfunctional forms for '(t,x0) in
(17).We demonstrate below how identification of the parameters may
be secured by subdividing the sample of all workers into two subsamples:
one for which x0 =0(workers on their first job ever) ,and the other
for which x0>0. In fact,in the following illustration for an additive
fixed-effect parametrization àf s(t,x,z),the parameters are overiden-
tified,which suggests that identification may be secured for more
complex functional forms which we hope to consider in future work.
The following additive fixed-effect formulation is perhaps inade-
quate in captring the individual differences,but it is adequate as
an illustration of the estimation method.Let
(22) s(t, x, z) —z+S(t,x)
where, without loss of generality S(o, o)0. Onepossibleway to pro-
ceed is to take first differences in equation (22) and eliminate z,
thereby also eliminating the selection bias. There are two proble
with this approach. First, using differences in separation probabil-
ities as the dependent variable leads to coefficients that are not— 22—
significant. Secondly,there is then no possibility of estimating
thevariance ofz• We have therefore chosen a differentprocedure,
whichis based on deriving two separaterelationships associatd with
equation (22).
Let z Ct, x)beconditional expectation of z and s Ct, x)the cor4—
ditionalexpectation of the separation rate given t and x. Then,
taking conditional expectations in equation (22),





F(tjx—t, z) —1—exp {zt —fSCy,x-t +y)dy}. 0
application of (16) and (15) leads to
(24) zCt, x) a(x—t, z) p(z)dz for x > Ie a(x—t, z)pfz)dz
—zx I ze (z)dz z(x,x)— forx—
/ep(z)dz
(Workers with x -tare on their first job.)Assumenow that p(z) is
thenormaldistribution. Thenastraightforwardcalculationyields
z(x, x) — — a2 x
whereuanda2are themeanand variance of z.— 23—
Sothat (for workers on their firstjob)
(25) s(x, x) —'z+S(x,x) —
Thediscontinuity of the p distribution atx 0 carriesover to z Ct, x).
It is seen from (24) that
z(O,0) au
while taking thelimitin (24) and observing (7),
2
urn z(O, x) —u+ xO
To obtain a closed—form approximation to z Ct, x) for x >t,a
first-order Taylor's expansion is performed in equation (24) around the
pointCt —0,xc) where £> 0.Then
I za(c, z) o(z)dz z(o, Ta(c,z) p(z)dz
[2_a(c, z) pCz)dz +fza Cc, z)p(z)dZj
z (0, c) —— t Ia(c,z) p(z)d.z
+['a(c,z) p(z)dz +fa(c,z) p(z)dz] $za(,z)p(z)dz
(I aCt,z) p(z)dzF
and




For anyx >t,and any c>Cno matter how small,- 24 -




c+O + (Urn z(o, e)] t
+ [urnz(o,c)] x c-O
+Higherorder texrnz






+Iz(s (o,o,z) +3t(0s0,z)3 p(z)dz] x
— — si1(1z3pdz +p(a+y)]+u2(1z2pdz +a+y)
where aS Co, o) and x — S(o, o)
If p(z) is a syetric distribution so thatthe third order rnent about











I sCo,o,z) p(z)d.z •
/z s(o,o,z) p(z)dz+f[s(o,o,z) + st(0,o,z)] p(z)dz
[1 s(o,o,z)p(z)dz]2— 25,
inzto, c) (u2—1.) (a+y)+1—3a2— +
11
Also,
z Co, e) - cO X
Takingan expansion in (23),
sit, x) —ax+yt+z(t,x) +Higherorder terms
But making the substitti0into (26),
z(t,x) —p++((2—1) (a +y)+1-3a2—2+
—o(o+')x +Higherorder terms. 2
12
Thereforefor t <x,




Also, expanding in (25)
(28)s(x, x) —i + (a+y—a2)x+Higherorder terms.
Equations (27) and (28) axe thetwo basic relationshipsestimated.— 26—
Theseparation propensity is of courseunobservable.ALl that is
observed is whether or not an individual, has changed jobs within a par-
ticular period.Let y —1if the worker has changed jobs within the
period (x, x +x),andzerootherwise.
• Prob(y—l)—l—expt—f s(t+y,x+y,z)dy}
—s(t,x, z) x +0[()23
Silarly
Prob (y —0)—1—s(t,x, z)x+0((Ax)2)
Therefore y has a mean equal to s(t, x, z) Ax +0((AX) 2]
Ignoringthe
—(z+S(t,x)]Ax+u
where u is a disturbance with zero mean. In the data Ax was equal to
two years. The regressions for the separation equations are reported
in the first two columns of Table II —1.(Separateregressions were
also run for quits and for layoffs and they are reported in the table,
although they do not have an interpretation within the mathematical
structure presented above).The three linear coefficients and the
two constant terms provide five restrictions on the four parameters
so that the parametersare overidentified.However,the relative mag-
nitudeofthe two constant terms is reverse from that implied by the— 2-7 — -
theory,leading to an estimate of which is negative, which may
mean that the additive fixed-effect formulation is inadequate.In future
work, we intend to experiment with different functional forms for the
separations and wage equations, focusing on the question concerning
the best way to model the individual differences, and to organize the








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Thisexample was supplied by R. Shakotko.
2
Helpfulcomments by J. Heckman on an earlier version of this
paper have led to considerable improvementof this section.REFERENCES
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